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In a recent paper [Z. J. Zhang and Z. X. Man, Phys. Rev. A 72, 022303(2005)], a multiparty quantum secret sharing protocol based on 
entanglement swapping was presented. However, as we show, this protocol is insecure in the sense that an unauthorized agent group can recover 
the secret from the dealer. Hence, we propose an improved version of this protocol which can stand against this kind of attack. 
 
With the development of quantum technology, quantum cryptography has become a hot research topic in the field of 
information security. As one important branch of quantum cryptography, quantum secret sharing (QSS) has attracted 
much attention [1-6]. In a simplest secret sharing, Alice, the dealer, wants that a secret is shared between her two agents 
(i.e., Bob and Charlie) so that it can be recovered only when they collaborate. Equivalently, only one agent, say Bob, 
cannot obtain any information about the secret. That is to say, Bob and Charlie constitute an authorized agent group, of 
which anyone, Bob or Charlie, is unauthorized. In general, during a multiparty quantum secret sharing (MQSS) process, 
there are more than two agents and not all of them are honest. Therefore, a secure QSS protocol should be able to ensure 
that any unauthorized agent group cannot elicit information about the secret. However, when discussing the security of a 
MQSS protocol, people tend to ignore the attack from the real agents. As mentioned in Ref. [7], a participant generally has 
more power to attack than an outside eavesdropper. So, we should pay more attention to the participant attack in the 
procedure of designing a secure MQSS protocol. 
In a recent paper[6]，Zhang et al proposed a multiparty quantum secret sharing protocol based on entanglement 
swapping. This protocol has several good features due to using Bell state and dense code. For example, it is easy to be 
implemented, and it achieves a high efficiency. But it is a pity that this protocol has a drawback. That is, some 
unauthorized agent groups may recover the secret by utilizing a special strategy. Consequently, this protocol is insecure 
against the participant attack.  
Let us start with the brief description of MQSS protocol presented in Ref. [6], which we will call Zhang-Man protocol 
later. Without loss of generality，we take the four-party QSS protocol as our example. In such a protocol, Alice will split her 
key (the secret) into three pieces and then distribute them to her agents Bob, Charlie, and David, respectively. The three 
agents can deduce Alice’s key if and only if they cooperate. The particular procedure is as follows (see Fig. 1). Firstly, 
Alice, Bob, Charlie, and David prepare an EPR pair
12
−Ψ , 
34
−Ψ , 
56
−Ψ , and 
78
−Ψ  respectively , where 
1 ( 0 1 1 0 )
2
−Ψ = −  [see Fig.1 (a)]. Secondly, each of them sends a qubit from his/her EPR pair to the next 
person [see Fig.1 (b)].With certain probability, Alice chooses the detecting mode where all the users check whether the 
qubits are transmitted in a secure manner (here the particular process to detect eavesdropping is not important to us, so 
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we do not describe it in detail). Otherwise, in the message mode, Alice performs randomly one of the following four local 
unitary operations 1 2 3 4{ , , , }u u u u on qubit 1. Here 1 0 0 1 1u = + , 2 0 0 1 1u = − , 3 1 0 0 1u = +  
and  4 0 1 1 0u = − . These operations represent Alice’s secret, {“00”,”01”,”10”,”11”}, respectively. Afterwards, 
Alice performs a Bell-state measurement on qubits 1 and 8 and announces the measurement outcomes publicly. Finally, 
Bob, Charlie, and David perform a Bell-state measurement on their own qubit pairs in turn [see Fig.1 (c)]. The 
measurement results are their own pieces of secret.  
 
 
FIG.1.The Zhang-Man protocol for four-party quantum secret sharing. Each circle represents a qubit and the solid one denotes a qubit on which a 
unitary operation will be, respectively. The line between qubits indicates their entanglement. 
 
During the process of reconstructing the secret, Bob, Charlie, and David cooperate to deduce the local unitary 
operation that Alice performed on qubit 1 according to their measurement outcomes and Alice’s announced message. 
Then they can attain the secret. 
In Ref. [6], the author claimed this MQSS protocol is secure. However, if Bob and David, the unauthorized agent 
group, are dishonest, they can steal Alice’s secret without the help of Charlie by using the following strategy. In the 
detecting mode, Bob and David act according to the legal process. But in the message mode, Bob sends the qubit 2 to 
David and David sends the qubit 6 to Bob. After that, Bob performs a Bell-state measurement on the qubits 3 and 6 
instead of that on 2 and 3. Similarly, David makes the same measurement on the qubits 2 and 7 instead of that on 6 and 7. 
By this way, as depicted in Fig. 2, Bob performed an entanglement swapping with Charlie while David with Alice. 
Therefore, David can easily deduce Alice’s operation on the qubit 1 (i.e., the secret of Alice), and Bob can obtain Charlie’s 
measurement result (i.e., the piece of secret of Charlie) according to the rule of entanglement swapping. For instance, if 
Alice’s measurement result is 
18
+Φ  and David’s is 
27
+Ψ , David knows Alice’s unitary operation is 4u , that is, the 
secret bits are “11”, On the other hand, if Bob’s measurement outcome is 
36
−Φ , he knows Charlie’s result is 
45
−Φ .  
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FIG.2. A two special dishonest parties cooperate attack on Zhang-Man’s protocol. 
 
Since this attack only happens in the message mode, Alice can’t detect whether Bob makes Bell-state measurement 
according to the protocol. So this attack would not introduce any error. A desirable question is whether it can be detected if 
Alice does an additional detection as other QKD protocols generally do, that is, Alice requires all her agents announce 
some sampled key bits and compares them after the key distribution was finished (but before Alice’s declaration of her 
outcomes). The answer is negative. Let 36ϕ  and 27ϕ  are the measurement results of Bob and David, respectively. 
In the additional detection, Bob and David can escape successfully by announcing 
36
U ϕ  and 27U ϕ , where 
1 2 3 4{ , , , }U u u u u∈ . Such announcements will not introduce any error. We consider the same scenarios as that of the 
above example. Hence, Charlie’s results are
45
−Φ . Bob announce a fake information, which his results are
23
−Φ . By 
the same way, David publish that his results are
67
+Ψ . Because 
12 78 18 27 18 27 18 27 18 27
1 ( ) (1)
2
− − − − + + − − + +Φ ⊗ Ψ = Φ ⊗ Ψ + Φ ⊗ Ψ + Ψ ⊗ Φ + Ψ ⊗ Φ
27 34 23 47 23 47 23 47 23 47
1 ( ) (2)
2
+ − − + + − + − − +Ψ ⊗ Ψ = Φ ⊗ Φ + Φ ⊗ Φ + Ψ ⊗ Ψ + Ψ ⊗ Ψ  
47 56 45 67 45 67 45 67 45 67
1 ( ) (3)
2
+ − − + + − + − − +Φ ⊗ Ψ = Φ ⊗ Ψ + Φ ⊗ Ψ + Ψ ⊗ Φ + Ψ ⊗ Φ  
The results of Bob, Charlie, and David are match to Alice’s previous state of the EPR pair (1, 2) and her measurement 
outcomes on the EPR pair (1, 8). Therefore, no error was introduced, i.e., Alice cannot detect eavesdropping even if she 
performs a new detection at the end of the process of Zhang-Man protocol.  
The above eavesdropping strategy is easy to be generalized to a multiparty case. We assume that Alice splits her 
secret into n parts and distributes it to n agents, Bob1, ..., Bobn. According to the attack strategy described above, Bob1 and 
Bobn can cooperate and eavesdrop the secret without being detected. More generally, if Bobi and Bobj (j>i) attack this 
protocol collectively, they can make the pieces of secret of the other agents between them i.e. Bobk (i<k<j) unnecessary in 
the process of reconstructing the secret, that is, the remainders can attain Alice’s secret without the help of these agents. 
Nevertheless, in Zhang-Man protocol, it requests that no subset of agents is sufficient to attain the secret. Hence, 
Zhang-Man protocol may be insecure if there are two or more dishonest parties. 
To improve the security of Zhang-Man protocol, we make a modification on it so that the improved protocol can stand 
against this kind of attack. For convenience，we also discuss a four-party QSS protocol as illustrated in Fig.3. 
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FIG.3. A improved MQSS protocol. 
(1) Alice prepares four EPR pairs 
12
−Ψ ,
34
−Ψ ,
56
−Ψ ,
78
−Ψ  [see Fig.3 (a)]. 
(2) Alice sends qubits 2 and 3 to Bob. After Bob received these qubits [see Fig.3 (b)], Alice randomly 
chooses the following two procedures: a) The detecting mode. Alice chooses at random whether to 
measure qubit 1 in the rectilinear basis { 0 , 1 } or the diagonal basis{ , }+ − . After taking the 
same measurement on qubit 2, Bob tells Alice his measurement outcome through the classical channel. 
Alice compares their measurement results and detects eavesdropping. b) The message mode. Alice 
chooses randomly one of the four local unitary operations, },,,{ 4321 uuuu , which represent Alice’s 
secret, and performs this operation on the qubit 1, which encodes the two secret bits on the Bell state. 
Then Alice measures the Bell operator on qubits 1 and 4. Bob makes a Bell-state measurement on 
qubits 2 and 3. The results of this measurement define his piece of secret. 
(3) Alice sends qubits 4 and 5 to Charlie. After Charlie received these qubits[see Fig.3 (c)], Alice randomly 
chooses either of the following procedures: a) The detecting mode. The concrete process is the same 
as that in step (2). b) The message mode. Alice measures the Bell operator on qubits 1 and 6. Charlie 
makes a Bell-state measurement on qubits 4 and 5. The results of this measurement define his piece of 
secret.  
(4) In terms of the same method, Alice sends qubits 6 and 7 to David and he can attain his piece of secret 
by Bell-state measurement. 
(5) Alice announces the measurement outcomes on qubits 1 and 8 publicly.  
It can be simply verified that Bob, Charlie, and David can reconstruct the secret according to the rule of entangled 
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swapping if they collaborate. For example, if the results of Alice, Bob, Charlie, and David are 
18
+Φ ,
23
−Φ ,
45
−Φ  
and
67
−Ψ  respectively, since the initial states of the qubits 7 and 8 is
78
−Ψ , they can know that the EPR pair (1, 6) 
have been projected to 
16
+Φ  in terms of Alice’s and David’s results. By the same way, they can deduce the state 
14
+Ψ  of the EPR pair (1, 4) and
12
+Φ of the EPR pair (1, 2). Finally, they can determine that the secret is “10”. It 
should be emphasized that the users need not restart the protocol if Alice chooses the detecting mode in step (3) and (4), 
since Alice can prepare a new EPR pair in the same Bell state to resume the protocol. 
When Alice measures the Bell operation on qubits 1 and 4, the secret is split into two parts, which are the 
measurement outcomes of the EPR pair (2, 3) and (1, 4). So if Bob and David want to attain the secret, they should know 
the Bell state of the qubits 1 and 4. Because the EPR pair (1, 4) is still in Alice’s site, Bob and David cannot obtain any 
information about the secret even if Bob sends qubit 2 to David. Then Alice split it into two parts by entanglement 
swapping, which are the Bell states of the EPR pair (1, 6) and (4, 5). Since the channel between Alice and Charlie is 
secure, only Charlie knows the measurement results on the EPR pair (4, 5) and anyone cannot attain it without being 
detected. Hence Bob and David cannot recover the secret without the assistance of Charlie. It means that the improved 
protocol can stand against the attack presented in this paper. When Alice detects the security of the channel between 
Alice and her agent, only the agent’s outcomes are required without the cooperation of any other agent. So the improved 
protocol is also secure against the attack proposed in Ref. [8].  
In summary, we have proposed a special attack strategy to Zhang-Man protocol [6], in which unauthorized agent 
group can collaborate and eavesdrop the secret without being detected. Furthermore, an improvement on Zhang-Man 
protocol, which makes it secure against this kind of attack, is presented. Finally, we make a simple security analyses on 
the improved protocol. 
 
Acknowledgements 
This work is supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant No. 60373059, the Major 
Research Plan of the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant No. 90604023, the National Research 
Foundation for the Doctoral Program of Higher Education of China under Grant No. 20040013007, the National 
Laboratory for Modern Communications Science Foundation of China, Grants No. 9140C1101010601, the Graduate 
Students Innovation Foundation of BUPT and the ISN Open Foundation. 
 
Reference 
[1] M. Hillery, V. Bužek and A. Berthiaume, Phys. Rev. A 59 (1999) 1829. 
[2] A. Karlsson, M. Koashi and N. Imoto, Phys. Rev. A 59 (1999) 162. 
[3] R. Cleve, D. Gottesman and H.K. Lo, Phys. Rev. Lett. 83 (1999) 648. 
[4] D. Gottesman, Phys. Rev. A 61 (2000) 042311. 
[5] G.P. Guo and G.C. Guo, Phys. Lett. A 310 (2003) 247. 
[6] Z.J. Zhang and Z. X. Man, Phys. Rev. A 72, 022303(2005) 
 6
[7] F. Gao, Q.Y. Wen and F.C. Zhu, Physics Letters A 360 (2007) 748–750 
[8] F.G. Deng, X.H. Li, P. Chen, C.Y. Li and H.Y. Zhou, e-print quant-ph/0604060.  
